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Cultural rights in the Case- Law  
of the International Court of Justice  
 
 
Abstract: One of the most remarkable developments of the new millennium has been the 
expansion of debates on culture at the highest levels of the international community’s 
decision-making processes. This development has necessarily had an impact on cultural 
rights empowerment, including enhancing their justiciability. Substantial progress has been 
made both at a regional and international level. Yet, not all thresholds have been reached. 
The International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’) has never explicitly addressed cultural rights in its 
case-law. Despite its ‘multicultural’ composition, it is only with great difficulty that the Court 
examines questions related to culture. However, a thorough examination of the 
jurisprudence of the ICJ reveals that opportunities to take cultural rights seriously have 
arisen more than once. Recent judgments of the Court reveal the emergence of a certain 
trend calling for a ‘culturally sensitive’ understanding of legal issues brought to the Hague. 
The present paper submits that this trend is beneficial not only for the protection of cultural 
rights, but also for the maintenance of human and cultural diversity, as well as for the 
survival and livelihood of indigenous peoples. In light of the urgent worldwide need for 
peace, addressing culture as a legal issue before the ICJ, in accordance with articles 36 and 60 
of its statute, may be a fruitful pathway for the Court to follow in order to resolve 
international disputes. 
 
Key words: cultural rights; cultural diversity; intangible cultural heritage; collective claims; indigenous 
rights  
 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION   
 
The enlargement of the concept of ‘culture’ in the beginning of the 1990s and the 
strengthening of minority and indigenous peoples’ rights in the new millennium, along with 
the growth of UNESCO activities and NGOs’ advocacy, have all significantly contributed to 
the empowerment of cultural rights. The 1993 Vienna Declaration proclaimed, among other 
things, that ‘international human rights law has established individual and group rights 
relating to the civil, cultural, economic, political and social spheres’;1 the 2005 UNESCO 
Convention was the first UN binding instrument giving teeth to both the concepts of 
cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue;2 the 2005 World Summit Outcome resolution 
has highlighted the importance of ‘respect and understanding for religious and cultural 
                                                
I  Vienna Declaration, A/CONF.157/23 12 July 1993, at 1. 
2  Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, 20 October 2005, 
in force 18 March 2007, in UNESCO, Records of the General Conference, 33rd session, Paris, 3-21 
October 2005, (2 vols, 2005), vol.I, at 83, art.1(c)(d)(e). 
 diversity throughout the world’;3 and the 2007 Fribourg Declaration considered that ‘respect 
for diversity and cultural rights is a crucial factor in the legitimacy and consistency of 
sustainable development based upon the indivisibility of human rights’.4 
 
This ‘cultural rights movement’ has necessarily had an effect on cultural rights’ adjudication 
– and justiciability. Hence, both the statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (‘ICTY’) and the Rome Statute have integrated provisions related to 
cultural heritage; 5  cultural issues such as policies of cultural assimilation and cultural 
genocide have been examined on several occasions in the context of the war in Yugoslavia 
by ad hoc international tribunals;6 and regional human rights bodies, such as the Inter-
American Court,7 the European Court,8 and more recently, the African Court,9 have all had 
the chance to address issues related to cultural identity and group rights, regardless explicit 
inclusion -exclusion in the case of the European Court- of such rights in their mandate. As 
for the ICJ, however, things are less clear.   
 
Two preliminary observations seem crucial in this respect. First, the role of the ICJ as the 
ultimate dispute resolution mechanism has evolved in many ways as to include human 
rights.10 As noted by the former President of the Court, Rosalyn Higgins, the passage of time 
and the change of judicial culture more generally, along with the fact that a number of 
Judges with human rights related backgrounds are members the Court, may be some of the 
reasons for this change.11 Second, examining whether and to what extent the ICJ may 
                                                
3  See 2005 World Summit Outcome, UN Resolution 60/1 of 24 October 2005, para 14; see also e.g. Promotion of 
Religious and Cultural Understanding, Harmony and Cooperation, UN Res. 60/11, 3 November 2005, para. 4. 
4  Fribourg Declaration on Cultural Rights, 7 May 2007, preamble, para. 6.  
5  Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), art. 3 (d) and ICTY’s 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), arts. 8.2 (b)(ix) 
and 8.2 (e)(iv). 
6 Cultural issues have been  examined in a number of cases before the ICTY regarding the looting and 
destruction of non-Serb cultural and religious institutions, treasures and monuments, see e.g. Gotovina 
(IT06—90-T); Tadić (IT - 94-1-T); Miodrag Jokić (IT-01-42/1) ‘Dubrovnik’; Mladic (IT-09-92-T);  Kordić & 
Čerkez (IT-95-14/2) ‘Lašva Valley’. 
7  See generally Jo Pasqualucci, ‘International indigenous land rights: a Critique of the Jurisprudence of the 
Inter- American Court of human rights in the light of the United Nations Declaration on The Rights Of 
Indigenous Peoples’, (2009) 27 Wisconsin International Law Journal 51; A.Xanthaki, 'Indigenous Cultural rights 
in International Law’, (2000) 2 European Journal of International Law 343. 
8  See generally J.Ringelheim, ‘Ethnic Categories in European Human Rights Law’ (2011) Ethnic and Racial 
Studies 1; see also, J.Ringelheim, Diversite ́ culturelle et droits de l'homme: la protection des minorités par la Convention 
europe ́enne des droits de l'homme (Bruylant 2006), at 353–354 (in French). 
9  See e.g. the Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya, 4 February 2010 case, Communication No. 276/2003; see also 
D.Shelton, ‘Self-determination in regional human rights law: from Kosovo to Cameroon’, (2011)105 
American Journal of International Law 60, at 77–80. 
10  R.Higgins, ‘Human Rights in the International Court of Justice’, (2007) 20 LJIL 745, at 746. Cf also, 
B.Simma, ‘Mainstreaming Human Rights: The Contribution of the International Court of Justice’, (2012) 16 
Journal of International Dispute Settlement 7, and also G.Zyberi, ‘The Development and Interpretation of 
International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Rules and Principles through the Case- Law of the 
International Court of Justice’ (2007) 25 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 117.  
11  Higgins, supra note 10. Apart from Judges with ‘human rights backgrounds’, such as Rosalyn Higgins 
 consider cultural rights depends largely on the meaning and scope that one gives to these 
rights.  
 
The present paper submits that there is a recent tendency within the Court not only to 
address human rights, but further, to do so from a perspective that involves their cultural 
dimension. As it will be demonstrated further, the Court has already touched upon questions 
of culture in its case-law, including issues related to the right to a cultural identity, cultural 
heritage and cultural genocide. Despite the fact that it may not necessarily be the most 
appropriate forum to consider, or implement, cultural rights, this ‘culturally sensitive’ 
approach may be beneficial for the consolidation of minority and indigenous peoples’ rights, 
particularly in the context of territorial and boundary disputes.   
  
 
2. THE COMPETENCE OF THE COURT TO CONSIDER CULTURAL RIGHTS     
Prima facie, one should wonder whether the World Court is actually competent to address 
cultural rights. In fact, the examination of claims related to culture has a long history in 
international adjudication. The ICJ’s predecessor, the Permanent Court of International 
Justice (PCIJ) has had the chance to address cultural claims in all the cases it dealt with 
minority rights, particularly, claims related to language, religion and education. For instance, 
in the judgment on the Rights Of Minorities In Upper Silesia (1923) regarding the Polish 
minority schools of Upper Silesia, the PCIJ observed, inter alia, that each individual should 
have the right to choose whether they belong to a minority or not, and also that parents and 
teachers should a priori have the right to choose the language and education methods of the 
pupils or children for which they are legally responsible.12 A few years later, in the Greco-
Bulgarian communities (1930), it pointed to the right of a minority to maintain and preserve 
their own traditions,13 while, much more substantially, in the well-known advisory opinion 
                                                                                                                                            
herself, who was the first woman who joined the Court, and the German Judge Bruno Simma, former 
member of the Human Rights Committee, the jurisprudence of the Court is forged by the experiences of a 
number of Judges with ‘culturally sensitive’ backgrounds’. The Brazilian Judge and former president of the 
Inter-American Court, Antonio Cançado Trindade, who recently joined the Court has been a major 
inspirational force in the understanding of the interrelation between the individual and the international 
justice, and the former UNESCO the Somali Judge Abdulqawi Ahmed Yusuf, who joined the Court in 
2009, was prior his appointment a Legal Adviser and Director of the Office of International Standards and 
Legal Affairs at the UNESCO for 8years (March 2001-January 2009). In the past, the Sri Lankan Judge 
Weeramantry, had substantially contributed in the understanding of the plurality of legal systems in 
international law through its separate opinions, while the Indian Judge Singh, who had been involved in the 
revision of the 1954 Hague convention for the protection of the cultural property in case of armed conflict, 
was also a member of the UNESCO Commission for India.  
12  PCIJ, Rights of minorities in Upper Silesia (Minority Schools), Judgment of 26 April 1928 (series A, no. 15). 
Fourth Annual Report of the PCIJ (15 June 1927—15 June 1928), Series E, No. 4, pp. 210–214, reprinted 
in : Summaries of  Judgments, Advisory opinions and orders of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice, available at < 
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/PCIJsummaries/documents/english/PCIJ_FinalText.pdf>, 141, at 145.  
13  PCIJ, Greco-Bulgarian communities, Advisory opinion of 31 July 1930 (series B, no. 17), Seventh Annual Report 
of the Permanent Court of International Justice, (15 June 1930—15 June 1931), Series E, No. 7, reprinted 
in: Summaries of Judgments, supra note 12, at 204: ‘The criterion for determining what is a community […] 
is the existence of a group of persons […] having a race, religion, language and traditions of their own, and 
united by this identity of race, religion, language and traditions in a sentiment of solidarity with a view to 
preserving their traditions, maintaining their form of worship, ensuring the instruction and up-bringing of 
their children in accordance with the spirit and traditions of their race and mutually assisting each other’. 
 on the Minority Schools in Albania (1935),14 it explored further the idea of the interrelation 
between minority cultural and identity. In that case, regarding the religious and educational 
autonomy enjoyed by the Greek communities of Albania, the PCIJ did not only observe that 
the idea underlying the minority treaties was the need to ensure de facto equality for 
minorities,15 and to allow them to maintain their cultural specificities through a special 
minority regime;16 it further pointed to the need to maintain cultural diversity, namely, ‘to 
secure for certain elements incorporated in a State, the population of which differs from 
them in race, language or religion, the possibility of living peaceably alongside that 
population and co-operating amicably with it, while at the same time preserving the 
characteristics which distinguish them from the majority and satisfying the ensuing special 
needs’.17  
 
Contrary to the PCIJ, there is no explicit mandate for the ICJ to examine claims related to 
minority treaties, 18  neither, a fortiori, to cultural rights. On the one hand, the only 
‘collectivities’ that have locus standi before the Court are States,19 which recognize the Court’s 
compulsory jurisdiction. 20 Collective entities, such as minorities, indigenous peoples or any 
other groups of individuals are excluded from access to litigation. On the other hand, the 
jurisdiction of the Court is limited by the jurisdictional basis of one dispute or the other.21 
Under the present interpretation of the ICJ statute, an actio popularis (in the sense of a right 
granted to any individual, or group of individuals, or collectivities, to take a legal action to 
the Court in vindication of a public interest) is not allowed.22 Yet, nothing in the letter and 
spirit of article 36(1) of the ICJ statute excludes ‘culture’ from the Court’s competence.23 To 
                                                
14   PCIJ, Minority Schools in Albania, Advisory Opinion of 6 April 1935, (series A/B, no. 64), Eleventh Annual 
Report of the Permanent Court of International Justice, (15 June 1934—15 June 1935), Series E, No. 11, 
pp. 245–254, reprinted in Summaries of Judgments, supra note 12, at 351. See also, Andrzej Jakubowski, 
‘Key issues in the relationship between the world heritage convention and climate change regulation’ in 
Silvia Borelli and Federico Lenzerini, Cultural heritage, cultural rights, cultural diversity: new developments in 
international law (Martinus Nijhoff, 2012) 382. 
15  Ibid., para. 351. According to the Court, ‘equality in fact supplements equality in law; it excludes a merely 
formal equality’. 
16 Ibid. In the wording of the Court, this principle was ‘the grant to minorities of suitable means for the 
preservation of their racial peculiarities, their traditions and their characteristics’. 
17  Ibid. 
18  This has also been clarified by the ICJ since the 1970s; see This has also been clarified by the ICJ since the 
1970s; see South West Africa, Second Phase, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1966, at 39–41, paras. 66–9.  
19   ICJ Statute, art.34, para.1. 
20  Ibid, art.35, para.1. 
21  C.Greenwood, ‘Recent developments in International Law and the role of the International Court of 
Justice’, Lecture at the London School of Economics(LSE), 29 July 2010. 
22 Ibid. See also on this point the South West Africa cases, supra note 18, para.88 : ‘although a right of this 
kind may be known to certain municipal systems of law, it is not known to international law as it stands at 
present: nor is the Court able to regard it as imported by the ‘general principles of law’ referred to in Article 
38, paragraph 1 (c), of its Statute.’  
23  ICJ statute, art.36, para.1 provides that ‘the jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties 
refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and 
conventions in force’. 
 the contrary, the Court may deal with any sort of legal disputes between States, as well as 
with the interpretation of any United Nations treaty, including therefore disputes and treaties 
dealing with culture and cultural rights. The ICJ may also deliver advisory opinions at the 
request of UN organs on any issue, including therefore issues of a cultural interest.24 UN 
agencies are also entitled to request advisory opinions, although, until now, only one relevant 
case exists, regarding an individual’s appointment by the UNESCO. 25   
 
 
3. THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL IDENTITIES AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE ICJ 
‘HUMAN APPROACH’   
 
Cultural rights are perhaps the most controversial category of human rights. At least until the 
early 1990s, they were perceived as an ‘under-developed’ category of human rights. 26 Yet, a 
number of initiatives over the last decade,27 pivoting around the right to take part in cultural 
life,28 have substantially empowered cultural rights and extended their scope, highlighting 
their normative content. These initiatives, along with the affirmation of the principle of 
indivisibility of human rights, have entailed a largo sensu perception of cultural rights.  Thus, 
there should be no doubt today that the right to a cultural identity and a people’s right to a 
tangible or intangible heritage, along with the freedom to choose one’s culture, should be 
considered par excellence cultural rights. Several other rights such as the right to non-
discrimination may also be considered as such, especially when brought forward as group 
rights. 
 
  
3.1. RECOGNITION OF CULTURAL RIGHTS JUSTICIABLE CHARACTER IN THE CASE –
LAW OF THE ICJ    
The advisory opinion regarding the Palestinian Wall case (2004) 29  was one of the 
                                                
24  According to article 96, para. 2 of the UN Charter, the General Assembly may authorize the specialized 
agencies to request advisory opinions on legal questions arising within the scope of their activities.  
25  See Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the ILO upon Complaints Made against Unesco, Advisory Opinion, 
I.C.J. Reports 1956. See also generally, Abdulqawi Yusuf(ed.), Standard-setting in UNESCO (2007) Vol.1. 
26  See e.g. J.Symonides, ‘Cultural Rights’, in J.Symonides (ed.), Human Rights, Concept and Standards (2000), 175, 
175–227; J.Symonides, ‘Cultural Rights: A Neglected Category of Human Rights’ (1998) 158 International 
Social Science Journal, 559, and more generally, P.Meyer- Bisch, Les droits culturels, une catégorie sousde ́veloppe ́e 
des droits de l'homme (Editions Universitaires de Fribourg, 1993).  
27  See e.g. supra notes 1–4, and generally, E.Stamatopoulou, Cultural Rights in International Law: Article 27 of the 
UDHR and Beyond (Martinus Nijhoff, 2007). See also M.Bidault, La protection internationale des droits culturels 
(Bruylant, 2010). 
28  This right is recognised in article 27 (1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in article 15 (1) (a) 
of the International Covenant for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), as well as a number of other 
instruments. See in this respect, UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General 
comment No. 21, ‘The Right of everyone to take part in cultural life’, 21 December 2009, E/C.12/GC/21, 
para 3, and A.Yupsanis, ‘The Meaning of ‘Culture’ in Article 15 (1)(a) of the ICESCR – Positive Aspects of 
CESCR’s General Comment No. 21 for the Safeguarding of Minority Cultures’, (2012) 55 GYIL 345; see 
also, E. Stamatopoulou, ‘The right to take part in cultural life, Article 15 (1) (a) of the ICESCR’, ESRC 
Committee, E/C.12/40/9, 9 May 2008, p. 3. 
29  Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 ICJ 
Rec. 136. 
 opportunities the Court had to recognise cultural rights’ justiciability. Certainly the Court did 
not go as far as to discuss the dramatic situation in the Holy Land in its entirety, neither the 
right of the Palestinian people to their cultural identity. Yet, while making a number of 
valuable legal observations, the members of the Court did seize the opportunity to refer 
specifically to the ICESCR30 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), and justify 
their applicability in the occupied territories.31 Hence, not only did it find the settlements 
built by Israel unlawful;32 it also suggested that Israel is bound to comply with its obligations 
under international humanitarian law and international human rights law, including those 
created by the ICESCR.33 The Court equally observed that some of the obligations that 
Israel has to comply with may be of an erga omnes character34 and noted that the construction 
of the wall would impede the exercise of the Palestinian people’s rights to work, to health, to 
education and to an adequate standard of living.35 In the Court’s view, the ICESCR would be 
then violated.36 
 
The Advisory Opinion is significant, however, for an additional reason, namely the fact that 
its rationale allows perceiving certain cultural ‘nuances’ in rights traditionally perceived as civil 
and political, or social rights. Hence, on the one hand, the members of the Court made 
reference to the report of the Special Committee for the Palestinian people, whose members 
delineated the right to property and the right to agriculture by reference to practices related 
to ‘olive trees, fruit trees, water wells, citrus grows and hothouses upsands’.37 On the other 
hand, they referred to the reports of the UN Special Rapporteur for the right to food and 
the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories, which, 
again, point out that ‘many fruit and olive trees had been destroyed in the course of building 
the barrier’.38 A right to a cultural identity was not mentioned in the text of the Opinion. 
                                                
30   Ibid., at 192, para.130, regarding the right to work (Arts. 6 and 7 of the ICESCR); protection and assistance 
accorded to the family and to children and young persons (Art. 10 of the ICESCR); the right to an 
adequate standard of living, including adequate food, clothing and housing; and the right ‘to be free from 
hunger’ (Art. 11 of the ICESCR); the right to health (Art. 12 of the ICESCR); the right to education (Arts. 
13 and 14 of the ICESCR).  
31  Ibid.  at 192, para.130, referring to articles 16, 24, 27 and 28 of the CRC. 
32  Ibid, at 174–5, paras. 95–96, finding the Fourth Geneva Convention applicable in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories. 
33  Ibid. at 181 -193, paras. 114-137. See also F. Coomans, ‘The Extraterritorial Scope of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Work of the United Nations Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2011) Human Rights Law Review 11, 15, fn. 53.  
34  Ibid. at 199, para. 155. 
35  Ibid. at 181, para.112, invoking especially article 14 of the ICESCR on the right to education, which 
provides for transitional measures. 
36  Ibid, at 180, para. 112. According to the Court, the Covenant applies not only to the territories over which 
a State party has sovereignty, but also to ones over which that State exercises territorial jurisdiction, even 
though it contains no provision on its scope of application.  
37  Ibid. at 159, para.133, citing the Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting 
the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories Al5131311, 22 
August 2003, para. 26. 
38  Citing UN Doc. EICN.41200416, 8 September 2003, para. 9 and the Report by the Special Rapporteur of 
the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Jean Ziegler, "The Right to Food", Addendum, 
Mission to the Occupied Palestinian Territories, ElCN.41 2004110lAdd.2, 31 October 2003, para. 49. 
 Nevertheless, such references are precisely the type of elements that allow for human rights’ 
cultural dimension to emerge.  
 
 
3.2. THE EMERGENCE OF THE RIGHT TO A CULTURAL IDENTITY AND THE RIGHT 
TO INTANGIBLE HERITAGE IN THE CASE- LAW OF THE ICJ  
 
Despite the fact that cultural rights are generally ‘understood to include the right to a cultural 
identity’,39 a right to a cultural identity as such is not explicitly enshrined in human rights 
instruments. However, this right can be presumed from the specific features of the right to 
take part in cultural life,40 as well as from the nature of the legal obligations imposed on 
States by the ICESCR, and other relevant instruments.41 It goes without a say that the 
protection of intangible cultural heritage is a key aspect of the right to a cultural identity, 
since it ‘provides [both ‘communities and groups’] with a sense of identity and continuity, 
thus promoting respect for cultural diversity and human creativity’, as highlighted in the 
relevant 2003 UNESCO Convention.42  
 
 
3.2.1. A CUSTOMARY RIGHT TO SUBSTANTIVE FISHING    
 
The Navigational rights case (2010),43 opposing Costa Rica and Nicaragua, was an opportunity 
for the Court to consider the needs of the individuals affected by an interstate dispute, 
including their right to an intangible cultural heritage. In this case the Court was asked to 
interpret the navigational régime of the San Juan River, in light of a 1858 Treaty fixing the 
boundary between the two States on the Costa Rican bank. Costa Rica’s memorial focused 
on the riparians’ relationship with the river, invoking inter alia the detention and seizure of 
the riparians’ belongings associated with fishing, and requesting the Court to recognize that 
Nicaragua violated ‘the obligation to permit riparians of the Costa Rican bank to fish in the 
River for subsistence purposes’.44 The Court found itself unavoidably confronted to the 
question of the riparian population’s needs and way of life.45 The members of the Court 
                                                
39  F.Coomans, ‘Economic, social and cultural rights’ (1995), SIM Special no.16, Reports commissioned by the 
Advisory Committee on Human Rights and Foreign Policy of the Netherlands, p.4, para 4. 
40   See Stamatopoulou, supra note 28; General Comment No. 21, supra note 28, paras 49–50 and 51 in fine; also, 
Y.Donders, ‘Towards a Right to Cultural Identity?’, School of Human Rights Research Series, Vol.15, 2002. 
41  For example, the free exercise of one’s cultural identity, and the right to be taught about one’s own culture 
can be deduced by articles 6 (b) and 7 (b) of the Fribourg Declaration, cited supra note 4. See General 
Comment No. 21, supra note 28, para 49. 
42  UNESCO Convention for the safeguarding of the intangible cultural heritage (Paris, 17 October 2003), 
art.3. 
43  Dispute Regarding Navigational And Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Judgment of 13 July 2009.  
44  Memorial of Costa Rica, Vol 1, 29 August 2006, para.1.07-1.08, 5.142 et seq. 
45  Due to the absence of jurisdictional basis, not all issues related to the way of life of the riparian 
communities were examined (e.g. the fact that the inhabitants of the boards of the river ‘commonly used 
and still uses the river for travel for the purpose of meeting the essential needs of everyday life which 
require expeditious transportation, such as transport to and from school or for medical care’. See paras. 
74–76 of the Judgement and also Greenwood, supra note 21.  
 examined specifically Costa Rica’s claims about these communities’ fishing habits, and 
attributing significant importance to the fact that it was substantive, i.e. not commercial.46 In 
fact, the Court noted that fishing was the riparian communities’ customary right that should 
be respected by Nicaragua, 47  and this, without actually examining whether the two 
prerequisites for the formation of customary law existed (i.e. practice and opinio iuris)48 and 
without even minding that the disturbance of the fishing activities had occurred ‘post-date 
the filing of the Application’.49 The members of the Court further pointed to the ‘special 
relationship’ between the riparians and the river: their relationship with the river, and the 
damage that they would suffer. 50 The parties must be presumed’ says the Court, ‘ in view of 
the historical background to the conclusion of [the 1858] Treaty […] to have intended to 
preserve for the Costa Ricans living on that bank a minimal right of navigation for the 
purposes of continuing to live a normal life in the villages along the river’.51 
 
Apart from the obvious benefit of this judgment for the riparian communities of the San 
Juan river as ultimate beneficiaries of the Judgment, the case may have a further impact, as 
the judgment reminds human rights law phraseology, and specifically, indigenous cultural 
rights’ protection. It is the Human Rights Committee members who have first observed that 
‘culture manifests itself in many forms, including a particular way of life associated with the 
use of land resources, especially in the case of indigenous peoples’ and that ‘this right may 
include such traditional activities as fishing or hunting and the right to live in reserves 
protected by law’; 52  and it is the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(‘UNDRIP’) that proclaims that ‘indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and 
control the lands, territories and resources that they possess by reason of traditional 
                                                
46  Navigational And Related Rights, supra note 43, at 265, para.141: ‘The Court recalls that the Parties are agreed 
that all that is in dispute is fishing by Costa Rican riparians for subsistence purposes. There is no question 
of commercial or sport fishing’. 
47  Ibid., at 262–264, paras. 134-136.  
48  See, M. Milanovic, ‘The ICJ and Evolutionary Treaty Interpretation’ (2009) European Journal of 
International Law: Talk! (14 July 2009) < http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-icj-and-evolutionary-treaty-
interpretation/> accessed 28 July 2013. 
49  Navigational And Related Rights, supra note 43, at 264, para.137: ‘the Court notes that the alleged interferences 
by Nicaragua with the claimed right of subsistence fishing post-date the filing of the Application’. 
50  Ibid. at 264, para.137: ‘[…] the Court considers that in the circumstances of this case, given the relationship 
between the riparians and the river and the terms of the Application, there is a sufficiently close connection 
between the claim relating to subsistence fishing and the Application, in which Costa Rica, in addition to 
the 1858 Treaty, invoked other applicable rules and principles of international law’. 
51   Ibid. at 246, para.79. 
52  General Comment No. 23: The rights of minorities (Art. 27): 04/08/1994, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5, 
Para.7.  Cultural rights being group rights have also been implied by the Committee in other cases, starting 
with the Lubikon Lake Band case, as well as the Kitok case where ‘the HRC reaffirmed this wide 
understanding of culture’; see A.Xanthaki, ‘Multiculturalism and International Law; discussing international 
standards’ Human Rights Quarterly (2010) at 27. Furthermore, the understanding of an indigenous cultural 
identity in particular is a central, if not the main, aspect, of a people’s right to self-determination and indeed 
to a people’s existence. According to the UN Charter, this right is also the prerequisite for the maintenance 
of peaceful and friendly relations among nations, as well for their international cultural cooperation, 
whereas, article 22 of the African Charter, all peoples shall have the right to their economic, social and 
cultural development with due regard to their freedom and identity and in the equal enjoyment of the 
common heritage of mankind.  
 ownership or other traditional occupation or use […]’.53 It is equally interesting to note that 
the breach of Nicaragua’s obligations under the Navigational rights judgment was taken into 
account in the subsequent case adjudicated by the World Court related to the activities of 
Nicaragua on the border of Costa Rica, with respect to the construction of a canal across 
Costa Rican territory and the dredging works of the San Juan River.54 In this second case, the 
Court, again, considered the benefit of the riparian communities, ordering provisional 
measures in order to suspend Nicaragua’s dredging programme, on the basis of the relation 
between the damage caused and ‘the risk that the rights which might be adjudged on the 
merits to belong to Costa Rica’.55  
 
3.2.2. THE PROTECTION OF A NOMADIC WAY OF LIFE    
The ‘culturally sensitive’ approach appears to be much more consolidated in the Frontier 
dispute case, 56 opposing Burkina Faso and Niger. The judgment has a lot of merit, both for 
the protection of the nomadic cultural identity and for introducing culture explicitly into ICJ 
jurisprudence. One of the main issues of this case was that the boundary line, as defined in 
the pre-colonial period, raised serious problems for the Bellah people who lived in the 
Logomaten area. The latter were nomads ‘who were accustomed to travelling within a 
unitary area, which was now divided into two separate colonies’ and who ‘in order to retain 
their customary transhumant routes, or even to cultivate their croplands which overlapped 
the boundary, they had to pass from one Colony to the other’.57 As a response to this claim, 
the Court considered the question of the protection of the nomadic population without 
differentiating between the two Parties of the dispute, encouraging the parties to maintain 
their friendly relationships and develop them further. The rationale behind these observations 
was that ‘[h]aving determined the course of the frontier between the two countries […], as 
the Parties requested of it, the Court expresses its wish that each Party, in exercising its 
authority over the portion of the territory under its sovereignty, should have due regard to 
the needs of the populations concerned, in particular those of the nomadic or semi-nomadic 
populations, and to the necessity to overcome difficulties that may arise for them because of 
the frontier’.58 Furthermore, the Court noted that ‘the co-operation that has already been 
established on a regional and bilateral basis between the Parties in this regard, in particular 
under Chapter III of the 1987 Protocol of Agreement [by which the two Governments 
agreed to mark out their common boundary], and encourages them to develop it further’.59 
Judge Bennouna, in his declaration to the Court, highlighted the shortcomings of the 
traditional approach towards state delimitation, based on the principle of uti possidetis, noting 
that this approach has not always made it possible to achieve peace. In the words of the 
Judge: ‘the focus should perhaps be on the essence of the issue, because the frontier, as 
predicated on the Westphalian model, is far removed from the cultural heritage of this 
                                                
53  UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA 61/295, art. 26, para.2.  
54  Certain activities carried out by Nicaragua in the border area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Request for the indication of 
provisional measures, Order, 8 March 2011, para.1. 
55  Ibid. paras. 61–64. 
56  Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Niger), Judgment, 16 April 2013. 
57  Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Niger), Memorial of the Republic of Niger, April 2011, at 40, para.2.5.  
58  Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Niger), supra note 56, para.112.  
59  Ibid, para.112. 
 region of the world. In the framework of a good-neighbourliness relation, it is for the Parties 
to rediscover this heritage by deepening, as encouraged by the Court, their co-operation’. 
The culturally sensitive approach has been celebrated by Judge Cançado Trindade, who 
dedicated a chapter of his concurring opinion discussing the ‘human factor’ impact on 
settling frontier disputes. The former President of the Inter-American Court explained in 
fact that ‘the ICJ now sees that people and territory go together’, that ‘nomads have their 
history and their modus vivendi, projected in time immemorial’ and that, ultimately, in his 
perception, ‘even in the determination of frontiers in regions inhabited by human groups of 
such dense cultural features, one should not simply draw entirely and admittedly ‘artificial’ 
lines, overlooking the human element’, because ‘the centrality, in [his] view, is of human 
beings. 60 These broadminded visions of international law have been developed further by 
the same Judge in other cases, including the Kosovo advisory opinion (2010)61 and the recent 
judgement regarding Request for interpretation of the judgment of 15 June 1962 in the case concerning 
the Temple of Preah Vihear (2013). 62 In the former, he investigated the idea of a ‘people-
centered outlook in contemporary international law’, while in the latter, he underlined once 
more the connection between a territory and the people who live on this territory,63 noting in 
particular that that ‘in situations of the kind, one cannot consider the territory making 
abstraction of the local populations (and their cultural and spiritual heritage)’, who, in his 
view, ‘constitute the most precious component of statehood’.64     
 
 
3.2.3. THE EVOLUTION OF THE COURT’S APPROACH REGARDING PEOPLES’ RIGHTS  
This evolving approach of the ICJ vis-à-vis cultural rights is by no means granted. 
Indigenous peoples rights and the right to self- determination have been both issues raised 
by the parties at many occasions. 65 Yet, even when brought forward by the parties of an 
inter-State dispute, 66 never had the Court examined in detail such claims. The Court in fact 
has provided a solid basis of cultural aspects of the right to self-determination only in the 
context of colonial occupation, as it had been demonstrated in the Namibia67 and Western 
                                                
60  Judge Antonio Cançado-Trindade, separate opinion, Chapter IX. The human factor and frontiers. 
61  Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 
I.C.J. Reports 2010. Judge Antonio Cançado-Trindade, particularly Chapter XII and Chapter XIII. See also, 
infra, notes 106-110. 
62  Request for interpretation of the judgment of 15 June 1962 in the case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. 
Thailand) Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2013 (11 November 2013). See infra, notes 114–119. 
63  Ibid., Separate Opinion of Judge Canc ̧ado Trindade, paras. 30–33. 
64  Ibid., para. 31, referring also to A.A. Canc ̧ado Trindade, International Law for Humankind; Towards a New Jus 
Gentium, 2nd ed., The Hague, Nijhoff/The Hague Academy of International Law, 2013. 
65  See generally, G.Zyberi, ‘Self­determination through the lens of the International Court of Justice’ (2009) 
56 (3) Netherlands International Law Review 429; A.Cassese, ‘The International Court of Justice and the 
Right of Peoples to Self-Determination’ in Fifty years of the International Court of Justice, Essays in Honour of Sir 
Robert Jennings (CUP 1996) at 351.   
66  E.g. the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, at 554, in which Mali 
had extensively referred to indigenous Logomaten people’s presence in the disputed area. 
67  Namibia, Advisory opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1950, para.131. In this case, the people of Namibia are recognized, 
inter alia, as a cultural entity, even though, no further explanations are given as to the meaning of this identity. 
 Sahara68 advisory opinions. It is only in the beginning of the 1990s that a traditional way of 
life may be taken as having an impact on the sort of an inter-State dispute. As an example, 
one may bring the case concerning the Kasikili/Sedudu island (1999).69 In this case, the Court 
had been charged with the task to determine Chobe river’s main navigational channel, on the 
basis of a 1890 Anglo-German Treaty (which situated this channel on the boundary line 
between Botswana and Namibia), and further, to determine the sovereignty claim over the 
Kasikili/Sedudu island. The identification of the thalweg on the Caprivi strip being 
particularly difficult due to the fluvial geomorphology and the flow of the watercourse, the 
Court considered another element as being crucial for the sort of the dispute: the Masubia 
tribesmen intermittent presence on the Kasikili/Sedudu island (‘Kasikili’ in Botswana and 
‘Sedudu’ in Namibian dialects).70 The Court interestingly observed that the Masubia people 
had the habit of growing crops on the island, benefitting from a certain autonomy, and that 
‘it [was] not uncommon for the inhabitants of border regions in Africa to traverse [State] 
borders for purposes of agriculture and grazing, without raising concern on the part of the 
authorities on either side of the border’.71 However, back then, the Court had not gone as far 
as to consider the territorial claim depending on the Masubia peoples’ interest, neither had it 
affirmed that the beneficiaries of a boundary dispute between two States may be a people, 
nor even a group of individuals.   
 
 
4. IS THE COURT AN APPROPRIATE FORUM TO CONSIDER CULTURAL RIGHTS ?    
 
The assumption that the Court is competent to examine issues related to culture– and that it 
has implicitly done so in several cases, as demonstrated above – does not necessarily mean 
that it is the most appropriate forum for cultural rights adjudication.   
 
A first set-back is that, in the case of an inter-state dispute, a State is necessarily vowed to 
advance its own interests. It is therefore more likely to promote the right to a ‘cultural 
identity’ when this cultural identity is the dominant cultural identity. This is particularly 
visible in the case of States that identify as nation-States, or States, which benefit from a 
certain ethnic and cultural homogeneity. Cultural claims may then be brought forward as 
interests of a State in its whole - and ad hoc judges have been particularly active in reminding 
this to the Court- underlying the association between ‘cultural’ and ‘national’ claims. One 
could consider here the Application of the Interim Accord case (2011), regarding Macedonia’s 
                                                
68  Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion of 16 October 1975, para.152. In this case, the Mauritanian entity (i.e. the 
indigenous Sahrawi people, living in Western Sahara already prior the Spanish colonisation and Morocco 
occupation) is identified by its distinguishable nomadic way of life. 
69  Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana v Namibia) Judgement, I.C.J. Reports 1999, at 1094, para.74. One of Namibia’s 
arguments in casu was the fact that the Masubia people had been occupying Eastern Caprivi from the 
beginning of the colonial period, highlighting that ‘[tlhe Masubia of the Caprivi Strip have used and 
occupied Kasikili Island as a part of their lands and their lives’. 
70  Specifically, whether the long-standing, unopposed, presence of Masubia tribespeople on Kasikili/Sedudu 
Island constituted subsequent practice in the application of the [1890] treaty’. The Court replied in the 
negative.  
71  Kasikili/Sedudu Island, supra note 69, para.74: ‘It is, moreover, not uncommon for the inhabitants of border 
regions in Africa to traverse such borders for purposes of agriculture and grazing, without raising concern 
on the part of the authorities on either side of the border’. 
 admission to the NATO (Greece objected to Macedonia’s entrance to the NATO for the 
time that FYROM would use of the name ‘Macedonia’).72 The Greek ad hoc judge pointed to 
the link between the name and the State’s national and cultural identity: ‘the issue of the 
name, which represents an obstacle with significant political and cultural consequences not 
only to the FYROM’s admission to specific international organizations, but also to bilateral 
relations’.73 The Judge, further, suggested that ‘it is important to recall here that, immediately 
after its independence, the new State embarked upon a series of actions with irredentist aims 
and acts contesting the Greek [historical and] cultural heritage, which were considered 
unacceptable by Greece’.74   
  
Another illustration of such situation is the Land and maritime boundary between Cameroon and 
Nigeria (2002) 75 regarding sovereignty over the Bakassi Peninsula and the lake Chad. Apart 
from their obvious economic interest of the disputed areas due to its oil-rich soil, the latter 
was also home to a large number of indigenous peoples, such as the Mio and the Calabar 
(Obong) people.76 The Nigeria’s memorial to the Court made extensive reference to the 
indigenous peoples living in Nigeria– including their separate system of education, their 
distinguishable religious and civic organization and the maintenance of traditional  
substantive agriculture and fishing activities. Among the components of the historical 
consolidation of its title over the disputed areas, it cited not only ‘the attitude and affiliations 
of the population of Darak and the other Lake Chad villages’ but also, ‘the existence of 
historical links with Nigeria in the area, and in particular the maintenance of the system of 
traditional chiefs’ and ‘the exercise of authority by the traditional chiefs, which is claimed to 
be still an important element within the State structure of modern Nigeria[…]’. 77 The only 
allusion to the inhabitants of the land (i.e. the indigenous peoples who lived in the region 
under Nigerian control) was therefore made indirectly,78 something which has been heavily 
criticized by Nigerian authorities.79  
                                                
72  Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece), 
Judgment of 5 December 2011, I.C.J. Reports 2011, at 644. 
73  Ibid., dissenting opinion of Judge ad hoc Prof. Roucounas, at 729, para.23. 
74  Yet, the majority of the Court did not seem to be persuaded about Greece’s objection, i.e. that the 
applicant’s admission to the NATO was taken for the purpose of achieving the cessation of FYROM’s use 
of the symbol, at 689–690, para.156–157. 
75  Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening), 
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, at 303.  
76  Ibid., at 315, para.21.  
77  See e.g. Nigeria’s Counter-Memorial of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Volume 1 Bakassi (Chapters 1–11), 
1999, at 21 et seq, 80 et seq and 425 et seq.  
78  Land and Maritime Boundary, supra note 75, at 405, Para.205 (Nigeria’s Counter-Memorial cited by the Court). 
As the Court noted, ‘in sub- Saharan Africa […] treaties termed ‘treaties of protection" were entered into 
not with States, but rather with important indigenous rulers exercising local rule over identifiable areas of 
territory’. 
79  See the voices for a review of the matter by the ICJ according to article 61 of the ICJ statute; see e.g. John 
Austin Unachukwu, ‘ICJ judgment on Bakassi: The ‘fresh facts’, 9 Oct 2012,  
<thenationonlineng.net/new/law/icj-judgment-on-bakassi-the-fresh-facts/ >. Indigenous peoples do not 
have access neither as third parties intervening, in virtue of  article 62 of the ICJ statute, which provides that 
‘1. Should a state consider that it has an interest of a legal nature which may be affected by the decision in 
the case, it may submit a request to the Court to be permitted to intervene. 2. It shall be for the Court to 
  
Likewise, in the Territorial Dispute case (1994) 80, regarding the decennial (1973-1987) dispute 
between Qaddafi-led Libya and Hissene Habré-led Chad over the Aozou Strip, State 
interests played a substantial role. Libya extensively referred to indigenous peoples’ presence 
in the area, dedicating several pages of its memorial to the indigenous tribes of the Tibesti 
Region, and highlighting the control it had over indigenous tribes since the beginning of the 
century, as indicated in a number of maps submitted to the Court. 81  Additionally, it 
specifically referred to the religious and cultural identity of these tribes, noting the 
importance of the names, identity, origin and location of the various tribal groups and 
indigenous peoples, and their cultural and religious (Islamic) ties with Libya. Yet, again, in 
this case, it seemed unnecessary for the Court to consider indigenous peoples rights, i.e. the 
title inherited from indigenous peoples in application of the principle of uti possidetis juris,82as 
it had been claimed by Libya.83  
   
Another setback for the Court to consider cultural rights is that the Court cannot extent its 
jurisdiction beyond the jurisdictional basis of the dispute. Until now, a solid basis for 
examination of cultural claims has never been explicitly provided. The way that the ICJ dealt 
with the question of cultural genocide in 2007 in the Application of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide case84 may be an illustration of this remark. 
Bosnia-Herzegovina specifically claimed that the Bosnian Serb forces ‘attempted to eradicate 
all traces of the culture of the protected group through the destruction of historical, religious 
and cultural property’ and that the destruction of such heritage was ‘an essential part of the 
policy of ethnic purification’ indented to wipe out the traces of [the] very existence of the 
Bosnian Muslims’.85 Yet, the Court did not go as far as to recognize the existence of a 
cultural genocide, highlighting, precisely, that the Sixth Committee’s travaux preparatoires of 
the Genocide Convention did not include cultural genocide in the list of punishable acts.86 
The ad hoc Bosnian Judge’s view is more interesting in this respect, his arguments going way 
beyond the text of the Genocide Convention. This Judge explained in fact that the 
‘[Bosnian] Muslim identity is not merely a religious identity, but rather refers to a group of 
persons sharing a particular culture, language and traditional way of life’.87 Observing that the 
                                                                                                                                            
decide upon this request.’ 
80  Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), 3 February 1994, I.C.J. Reports 1994, at 6. The two parties 
brought the dispute to the Court after they failed to respect the relevant Peaceful Settlement agreement.  
81  Memorial submitted by the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Vol. 1, 26 August 1991, 38-54. 
82  Territorial Dispute, supra note 80, at 38, para.75. 
83  Ibid., at  232, Para.5.145 et seq. 
84  Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. 
Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, at 43. 
85  Ibid. at 176, para.320 and 182, para.335. 
86  Ibid., at 146-147, para.344: ‘However, in the Court’s view, the destruction of historical, cultural and 
religious heritage cannot be considered to constitute the deliberate infliction of conditions of life calculated 
to bring about the physical destruction of the grouat  Although such destruction may be highly significant 
inasmuch as it is directed to the elimination of all traces of the cultural or religious presence of a group’. 
87  Ibid., dissenting opinion of Judge Ahmed Mahiou (ad hoc judge appointed by Bosnia and Herzegovina), at 
387, para.74. 
 destruction of cultural monuments is one of the elements that may point to the existence of 
this specific intent, or a broader plan entailing a policy of genocide’,88 and by reference to the 
ICTY Chamber judgements,89 Judge Mahiou made the link between cultural rights, cultural 
heritage, genocide and ethnic cleansing.90 The ad hoc Serbian Judge, on the other hand, 
admitted that the duty to avoid genocide, from a criminal law perspective, ‘implies a totality 
of actions in the social, legal, economic, political and cultural spheres aimed at eliminating 
the real causes of genocidal pathology’.91 However, he also noted that there was never any 
intent to include ‘cultural genocide’ in the Genocide Convention.92   
 
Similarly, in the case of the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide,93 Croatia claimed before the ICJ that the looting and destruction of its 
cultural property amounted to a breach of the Genocide Convention,94 highlighting in 
particular that genocide ‘may not only be committed through physical destruction of a 
group, but also through destruction of a group’s cultural identity’.95 The return of its cultural 
property, which, according to Croatia, fell within the scope of the Genocide Convention,96 
was therefore a central part of its application. Although several of these concerns have been 
transferred to the ICTY, 97 since Croatia first lodged its application to the ICJ, it is certain 
that the Court will be confronted to these issues again when considering the merits of the 
case in the future. 
  
Even in the context of treaty interpretation, the ICJ jurisdiction is, again, restricted and 
largely dependent on the provisions of the specific Convention in question. An illustration 
                                                
88  Ibid., at 431, para. 84. 
89  Ibid. at 477, para. 91, referring particularly to ICTY Trial Chambers judgments in the Krstic ́and Blagojevic ́ 
et al. cases regarding the massacre in Srebrenica: ‘is true that the decisions reached on the merits by the 
ICTY in genocide cases are not numerous, but there are a great many findings of fact and of law 
concerning the commission of crimes against humanity, murder, rape, forcible displacement and the 
destruction of mosques and other traces of Muslim culture, and when these findings are taken cumulatively, 
they point to the existence of a broader plan entailing a policy of genocide […]’. 
90  Ibid., at 513, separate opinion of Judge Milenko Kreća (ad hoc judge appointed by Serbia and Montenegro), 
para.86: ‘ethnic purification is seldom an isolated act of forcible displacement, for it is generally 
accompanied by murder, rape, torture and other acts of violence and the destruction of the religious and 
cultural heritage in order to wipe out all trace of the ousted ethnic group’. 
91  Ibid., at 539, para.113. 
92  Ibid., at 513, para.35. 
93  Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Preliminary 
Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2008, p. 412 
94  Ibid., paras 21.1 and 21.2(c), as well as 142. See also the Written statement of the Republic of Croatia of its 
observations and submissions on the preliminary objections raised by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia and Montenegro), Vol.I, 29 April 2003, at 42–44 regarding the ‘missing cultural property’. 
95  Ibid., para 45. 
96  Ibid., para 45. See also, the Application instituting proceedings filed in the registry of the Court on 2 July 
1999 (Croatia v. Yugoslavia), para.12 in fine, and para.17, regarding the ‘1,821 cultural monuments were 
destroyed or damaged, including about 651 in the area of Dubrovnik-Neretva County and about 356 in the 
area of Osijek-Baranja County’ and the ‘19 park cultural monuments were damaged’. 
97  See supra note 6. 
 of this observation is a case brought before the Court in virtue of the International 
Convention on the Elimination Of All Forms Of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) – the only 
such case brought, until now, before the Court, the Case concerning application of the International 
Convention on the Elimination Of All Forms Of Racial Discrimination (2011),98 regarding the 
treatment of the Georgian ethnic minorities living in Russia. Interestingly, the claim brought 
forward by Georgia, based upon Articles 2(1), 3 and 5 of the ICERD, was based on a largo 
sensu interpretation of racial discrimination, which included ‘the negation and even 
obliteration of culture, religion, or language’.99 Hence, Georgia, in its extensive memorial 
submitted to the Court, denounced not only the Russian policies of racial hatred and 
segregation, aiming at creating ‘ethnically pure territories aligned with the Russian 
Federation’, 100  but also, the destruction of the ‘Georgian culture and identity by 
discriminatory legislation and other means’, 101 as part of the ethnic cleansing operated in 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Additionally, Georgia refers to the destruction of its minority 
cultural heritage,102 and negates the existence of strong ethnic, historic and cultural links in 
the two regions, which could, eventually, contribute to the integration of the minorities to 
the Russian territory.103 It is unfortunate that the Court rejected the claim on the basis of lack 
of competence, as this case would have provided an excellent opportunity for the Court to 
discuss both minority rights and the right to non-discrimination, both key features for the 
maintenance of cultural diversity. 
 
 
5. THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL HERITAGE AND THE MAINTENANCE OF 
CULTURAL DIVERSITY  IN THE CASE-LAW OF THE COURT   
Despite the positive observations regarding the culturally sensitive understanding of legal 
issues examined by the Court, as described in sections 3.1 and 3.2 of our paper, a lack of 
attention to the protection of cultural heritage and to the need for the peaceful coexistence 
of cultures, including the preservation of cultural diversity, is still evident in the Court’s case 
                                                
98   Case concerning application of the International Convention on the Elimination Of All Forms Of Racial Discrimination 
(Georgia v. Russian federation), Preliminary objections, 1 April 2011. The claims were relevant to disputes, 
which arose 1992 and 2008 and the application of Georgia was lodged on the basis of a breach of articles 2 
(1) (a), 2 (1) (b), 2 (1) (d), 3 and 5 of the Covenant. 
99  Memorial of Georgia, Vol.1, 2 December 2009, para. 9.10.  
100  Ibid. 1.3 and 2.31, with respect to the attempts of Russia ‘to change or to uphold a changed demographic 
composition of an area against the will of the original inhabitants’. 
101  Ibid., paras. 2.40-2.41. According to Georgia, ‘The destruction of culture and identity is equally 
impermissible and is prohibited by Articles 2(1)(a), 2(1)(b) and 2(1)(d), among others. Although Article 5 
does not specifically guarantee the equal enjoyment of the right to culture or identity as such, that right is 
embraced within a number of the other rights that are specifically mentioned, including: the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Art. 5(d)(vii)); the right to freedom of opinion and expression 
(Art. 5(d)(viii)); and the right to equal participation in cultural activities (Art. 5(e)(vi))’. 
102  Ibid, para. 3.83, referring to the case of the destruction of cultural monuments in two villages of the Eredvi 
municipality.  
103  Ibid., para 6.74, referring to Abkhazia’s de facto Foreign Minister, Sergei Shamba speech, according to 
whom ‘[t]he only obstacle to the integration of South Ossetia [into Georgia] is a separatist regime that 
basically consists of elements from security services from neighbouring Russia that have no historical, 
ethnic or cultural links to the territory’.  
 law in a number of contexts.    
 
First, in relation to discussions regarding the prohibition of racial and cultural segregation. 
Policies of apartheid have been condemned by the ICJ in the past, in the context of the South 
Africa cases: the observations of the former Judge of the Court Tanaka, for instance, 
pointing out that apartheid is not in conformity with the objectives of the colonial rule, 
namely ‘the promotion of well-being and social progress of the inhabitants’,104 have been a 
most known example of such denunciation.105  Yet, in more recent cases, such approach is 
not self-evident. For instance, in the Palestinian Wall opinion,106 despite its commendable 
observations, the Court failed to address the question of the wall as a symbol of apartheid. 
Likewise, in the context of the Kosovo opinion delivered in 2010, 107 regarding the legitimacy 
of the Kosovo declaration of independence, the Court did not address the question of 
cultural and religious heritage of Kosovo, neither the cultural aspects of the Kosovar 
people’s right to self-determination, or questions related to cultural diversity, even though 
these were important points raised by the Republic of Kosovo before the Court,108 and part 
of the rounds of negotiations held.109 In its analysis of the right to self-determination, and in 
light of the radically different views expressed during the proceedings, the Court refrained 
from mentioning the Kosovar people’s right to cultural identity, even though it went so far 
as to accept that the principle of self-determination has developed sufficiently in recent years 
in a way as to create a right to independence.110 The absence of jurisdictional basis may have 
been another reason for the Court strictly contenting itself in pronouncing on the 
permissibility of a unilateral declaration of independence in international law, rather then 
analysing the cultural aspects of the right to self-determination.  
  
Second, while examining the question of environmental damage, such as the Nuclear tests case 
(1974), 111 and more recently, the Pulp mills case (2010)112. In these cases, environment claims 
                                                
104  Judge Tanaka, dissenting opinion, at 285 et seq.  
105  South West Africa cases, supra note 18, para. 17. 
106  See supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.  
107  Kosovo opinion, supra note 61, at 403, para.75.  
108  Including of the ‘reconfiguration process’ of the UN interim administration, see, e.g. the further written 
contribution of the Republic of Kosovo, 17 July 2009, paras. 3.35, with regard to the violation of the 
constitutionally protected right ‘to preserve, foster and express their cultural, linguistic and other 
peculiarities’, and 4.36-4.39, referring to the cultural aspects of common art.1(1) of the ICCPR and the 
ICCPR, to the Vienna Declaration cited also supra note I, as well as to the Canadian Supreme Court 
Judgement, Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.), para. 138. 
109  Kosovo opinion, supra note 61, para.67, referring to Reports of the Secretary-General on the UN Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo, providing inter alia for the preservation and protection of cultural and 
religious heritage. Issues related to cultural rights, were raised only in the separate opinion of Judge 
Canc ̧ado Trindade (in Ch.VII, and also paras.164–165, referring to IACHR cases and the Durban 
Declaration), as well as the dissenting opinion of Judge Yusuf (in para 15., through a small reference to the 
Secession of Quebec case). 
110  Ibid., paras. 79-83. 
111  Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, at 457.  
112  Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010, regarding the 
construction of polluting pulp factories on the River Uruguay. 
 have not been brought forward as cultural claims. Yet, the protection of the environment 
may have important cultural aspects, both in relation to the maintenance of human diversity 
and the principle of sustainable development, as well as the problems of pollution, 
deforestation and threats to biodiversity, which may endanger all inhabitants of the regions 
in question, and be a threat for indigenous peoples survival.   
 
Third, in the context of discussions regarding the preservation of a universal cultural heritage 
as humanity’s right. Even though the universal cultural heritage seems to be established in 
theory,113 it is only a minority of Judges of the World Court who embrace this globalist 
approach.114An example of the absence of a generalized discussion on the relationship 
between universal heritage and the prohibition of segregation and cultural diversity is the 
order for provisional measures in the case concerning the re-examination of the 1962 
judgement concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (2011).115 In this case, it is again only 
Judge Cançado Trindade who, once more expressed a ‘culturally sensitive’ opinion 
highlighting that ‘cultural and spiritual heritage appears more closely related to a human 
context, rather than to the traditional State-centric context’.116  
The subsequent judgment of the Court, however, rendered in 2013, certainly  paves the way 
for more optimistic perspectives. Apart from its importance for the links between a people 
and a territory, as discussed earlier in this paper,117 the judgement is also a beacon of hope 
for the judicial enforcement of the international protection afforded to cultural heritage. In 
fact, contrary to the order, the judgement pays increased attention to the cultural significance 
of the Temple Preah Vihear. In line with the spirit of the UNESCO World Heritage 
Convention, the judgement points to the need of cooperation between the two States and 
the international community in the protection of the site as a world heritage, including under 
article 6 of the UNESCO Convention.118 The specific point on cultural cooperation, which 
has not been disputed by either of the ad hoc judges,119 has been further elaborated in Judge 
                                                
113  E.g. F.Francioni, ‘The Human Dimension of International Cultural Heritage Law: An Introduction’, 
(2011) 22 European Journal of International Law 9, arguing that the elevation of attacks against cultural 
property may attend the legal status of international crimes, especially war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, triggering the international community responsibility. 
114  See e.g. Judge Weeramantry’s dissenting opinion in the Advisory opinion on the legality of the use of nuclear weapons, 
8 July 1996, paras. 243–245 and 467.  
115  Request for interpretation of the judgment of 15 June 1962 in the case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. 
Thailand) request for the indication of provisional measures, 2011 I.C.J. 151, TT 1-3 (18 July 2011), 
regarding sovereignty over the temple and the ‘vicinity’ [of the Temple] on Cambodian territory. In the 
1962 Judgement, the Court had declared that the Temple of Preah Vihear, situated on the hill of Phnom 
Trap, was under Cambodian sovereignty, going on to observe that only Thailand was under the obligation 
to retreat its military forces. 
116  Ibid., Separate Opinion of Judge Canc ̧ado Trindade, para. 74.  
117  See Temple of Preah Vihear case (judgement), supra note 62.  
118  Ibid, at para 106. The judgement in fact explicitly mentions that ‘the Temple of Preah Vihear is a site of 
religious and cultural significance for the peoples of the region […] listed by UNESCO as a world heritage 
site’ and that ‘under Article 6 of the World Heritage Convention, to which both States are parties, 
Cambodia and Thailand must co-operate between themselves and with the international community in the 
protection of the site as a world heritage’. 
119  Ibid., declaration of Judges Guillaume and Cot (in French).  
 Cançado Trindade’s separate opinion: ‘ […] a case of territorial sovereignty to be exercised 
by the State concerned, in cooperation with the other State concerned, as parties to the 
World Heritage Convention, for the preservation of the Temple at issue as part of the world 
heritage (reckoned as such in the UNESCO List), to the (cultural) benefit of humankind’.120   
 
6. CONCLUSION   
 
The ICJ, at least until the 1990s, has held a rather conservative approach towards culture, 
avoiding discussions on group rights - with the exception, perhaps, of the opinions issued in 
the period of the decolonisation process and the subsequent proclamation of the peoples’ 
right to self-determination. The Court’s history, mandate and limited jurisdiction are all valid 
reasons for this approach. It is therefore most noteworthy that a culturally sensitive 
understanding of human rights may be visible in the Court’s recent case law, and particularly 
in the judgments of the Navigational Rights (2010), the Frontier Dispute(2013) and the Preah 
Vihear (2013) cases. As for the prohibition of segregation, however, our conclusions cannot 
been equally positive. The need to preserve cultural and human diversity and the interaction 
among cultures, both precious prerequisites to establish these ‘peaceful and friendly relations 
among nations’, so much cherished by the UN Charter,121 are still not given sufficient 
attention by the ICJ. This said, the present challenge for the World Court in clarifying the 
meaning of culture is twofold. First, to indicate how best to understand a cultural identity in 
the context of international disputes, with regard to claims underlying the peoples’ rights to 
self-determination, as well as territorial and boundary disputes. Second, to determine the 
extent to which culture can play a role in international law in managing both inter-State and 
intra-State cultural diversity. The institution of proceedings by Bolivia against Chile,122 
regarding sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean coast, which is home for a number of 
indigenous peoples, may be the challenge for the Court in this direction.  
 
	
  
                                                
120  Ibid., Separate Opinion of Judge Canc ̧ado Trindade, para. 12. 
121  The UN Charter stipulates inter alia that ‘developing friendly relations among nations based on respect for 
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples is among the purposes and principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations’. 
122  ‘Bolivia institutes proceedings against Chile with regard to a dispute concerning the obligation of Chile to 
negotiate the sovereign access of Bolivia to the Pacific Ocean’, ICJ Press release, No. 2013/11, 24 April 
2013. 
